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Religious Adjudication and the European Convention on Human Rights
Ian Leigh*
I. Introduction
How should a human-rights compliant state respond to the phenomenon of religious 
adjudication? This is the question underlying two recent developments that have re-ignited the 
debate about recognition of Sharia Law in Europe. In the first, a long-awaited independent 
review into Sharia Councils in England and Wales recommended a combination of diversion, 
education and state promoted self-regulation.1 In the second, the Grand Chamber judgment in 
Molla Sali v. Greece,2 the European Court of Human Rights found the system in Western 
Thrace whereby Muslims were subject to the jurisdiction of muftis over questions of 
inheritance to be in violation of the Convention. More significantly perhaps, since that system 
has already been superseded in any event, the Grand Chamber gave clear indications of the 
standards that any form of recognition must meet to comply with the Convention. In this article 
it will be argued that taken together these developments help sharpen our understanding of 
what it means to recognize religious law and whether a state that does so can meet it human 
rights obligations.
The focus of this article is on ‘religious adjudication’. This term requires brief preliminary 
explanation. Adjudication is a feature of what Maleiha Malik has termed ‘minority legal 
orders’.3 By this she is referring to cultures or religious groups whose social life is regulated 
by ‘[N]orms [that] determine how individuals should or should not act, as well as specifying 
the consequences of non-compliance’ and ‘institutions (for identification, interpretation and 
enforcement of norms)’ which together amount to ‘a social institution that is similar to a legal 
*British Academy Wolfson Research Professor, Durham Law School, Durham University.  I am grateful to 
Nicholas Aroney, Gavin Phillipson and Julian Rivers for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1 The independent review of the application of sharia law in England and Wales, Cm. 9560 (Feb. 2018). 
2 Molla Sali v. Greece App no. 20452/14 (ECtHR, 9 December 2018).
3 M.Malik, ‘Minorities and the Law: Past and Present’ (2014) 67 CLP 67 (hereafter, Malik, ‘Minorities and the 
Law’). In their recent wide-ranging discussion of the perceived challenge to liberal constitutionalism from 
systemic aspects of religion, Ran Hischl and Ayelet.Shachar also point to the normative similarities between 
religions and constitutions: R. Hischl and A. Shachar, ‘Competing Orders: The Challenge of Religion to Modern 
Constitutionalism’, (2018) 85 U of Chicago LR 425 (hereafter, Hirschl and Shachar, ‘Competing Orders’) at 
431-2.
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order’.4 Malik’s discussion draws impliedly on a Hartian model, suggesting that minority legal 
orders combine primary (normative) and secondary (institutional) aspects.5 From this point of 
view religious legal systems can vary in how closely they resemble positive law, depending on 
how developed their institutional mechanisms are. Some may provide for little more than 
mediation of disputes, whereas others have a sophisticated institutional framework for 
interpretation, enforcement and even change of norms. It is the institutional aspects of 
identification, interpretation and enforcement of religious norms that I term religious 
adjudication. The status of religious adjudication rather than of religious norms as such, I 
contend, is the central issue in contemporary debates ostensibly about religious ‘law’ in liberal 
states. 
Like the recent review in the UK, in this article I approach religious adjudication non-
judgmentally, as an existing social phenomenon. Religious adjudication takes place in a variety 
of contexts. Some- such as determinations by religious bodies, for example by the Beth Din, 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Tribunals or Sharia Councils over the availability of divorce or 
annulment of a religious marriage – involve the resolution of a dispute between two parties and 
have a clear analogue with adjudication by state courts. Others involve determinations by a 
religious community of whether its religious norms or standards have been broken leading to 
sanctions (such as the removal of a clerical licence or shunning) and are more analogous to 
professional disciplinary proceedings.  In view of the persistence of such practices the question 
tackled here is not how to discourage or eradicate them, nor how to formalise them, but rather 
how a state that is faithful to its human rights commitments should respond. More specifically: 
is state recognition of religious adjudication compatible with the ECHR and, if so, under what 
circumstances?
The discussion proceeds in the following way. Part II explains the different ways in which the 
state may relate to religious adjudication. It identifies as especially significant for the current 
debates religious adjudication that is permitted or tolerated but is not endorsed by the state. The 
approach of the European Court of Human Rights towards religious norms and religious 
adjudication is introduced in Part III, in particular its approach to religious autonomy and to 
the right of fair trial. Part IV focuses specifically on how the Court has dealt with cases 
4Malik, ‘Minorities and the Law’ 70-71.
5 cf H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961) ch.5.
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involving parallel systems, especially in its recent Molla Sali decision. Building on that 
discussion, Parts V and VI tease out two tests of compatibility from the jurisprudence that 
religious adjudication of all kinds must satisfy in order to comply with the Convention. These 
are, respectively, adequate judicial scrutiny by the civil courts and voluntarism. The concluding 
section (Part VII) draws the arguments together.
II. ‘Recognition’ and Adjudication
It will clarify the subsequent discussion to first explain the different ways in which the state 
may relate to religious law. This is necessary in part because of the confusion surrounding the 
discussion of ‘recognition’ of religious law, much of which is caused by an overly simple 
binary approach to legal norms. I shall argue that confronting the phenomenon of religious law 
the state has a spectrum of different approaches available6 and that to reduce these to the stark 
alternatives of prohibition of religious adjudication, on the one hand, or adoption or 
enforcement, on the other, is misleading. 
Much of the debate over ‘recognition’ of religious law focuses on one specific question about 
the interaction of state and religious law- whether state law should permit religious legal 
obligations to be enforced in the sense of allowing them to be adopted as or translated into state 
obligations.  Commentators sometimes refer, inaccurately, to parallel legal systems to describe 
schemes of this kind. Parallel systems do exist in some countries and these result in differential 
legal obligations fixed according to the religion of the parties, as is the case with the jurisdiction 
of religious courts in Israel7 or Malaysia8 over family matters. The attitude of the European 
Court of Human Rights to such parallel systems is discussed in Part IV below. Parallelism, 
however, is generally not what is under consideration in contemporary debates about 
accommodating religious adjudication in liberal states. More often the focus is on plural 
systems that result in ‘supplementary’ or ‘overlapping’ civil and religious jurisdictions.9 From 
6 cf  M. Zee, ‘Five Options for the Relationship between the State and Sharia Councils’ (2014) 16 Journal of 
Religion and Society 7 and L. Zucca, A Secular Europe: Law and Religion in the European Constitutional 
Landscape (OUP 2012) (hereafter, Zucca, A Secular Europe) ch. 6.
7  Y. Sezgin, Human Rights Under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India, (CUP 
2013) ch. 4. 
8  P. Cumper, ‘Multiculturalism, human rights and the accommodation of sharia law’ (2014) Human Rights Law 
Review 14, 31-57; A.Harding, ‘Malaysia: Religious Pluralism and the Constitution in  a  Contested  Polity’,  Middle 
East Law and Governance 4 (2012) 356–385.
9 See, for example, Bernard Jackson’s discussion of religious law in the State of Israel: B. Jackson,
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a theoretical perspective Lorenzo Zucca underlines the differing implications of parallel and 
plural systems for the relationship between positive law and religious law in a way that refers 
back to the difference between normative and institutional aspects of religious law (as briefly 
sketched in the introduction). Parallel systems, Zucca argues, involve the state in religious 
differentiation according to norms, whereas plural systems merely provide for religious 
adjudication.10 This is a helpful approach that can be applied to the current debate.11
The focus on enforcement is, I contend, a distraction, because it narrowly reflects only some 
of the contexts in which religious adjudication is encountered.12 It is meaningful to talk of the 
ecclesiastical law of the Church of England being ‘enforced’ by the state since it is part of the 
common law.13 Equally, commercial contracts providing for religious arbitration can be 
‘enforced’ under the Arbitration Act 1996.14 In the absence of a contrary intention the law of 
England and Wales applies to arbitration agreements15 but the parties may stipulate that the 
law of another jurisdiction16 or that religious law should govern instead.17 But even in these 
contexts the decision to be subject to religious law in the first place stems from a voluntary 
decision (to be ordained in the Anglican church, to enter into a contract with the clauses in 
question, and so on).
Moreover, to suggest that there is a dualism in which either religious law is either recognised 
or is not, creates the misleading impression that where it is not recognised religious 
10 Zucca, A Secular Europe ch. 6.
11 It would be misleading, however, to view minority legal orders solely from the point of view of their 
relationship with a given system of positive law. Such religious systems transcend national boundaries, even 
where the religious system has organised national, regional or local adjudicative bodies that correspond to the 
positive legal order. For example, pronouncement of a religious divorce by a rabbinical court or decree or 
annulment by a Catholic tribunal will be recognised universally. Depending on the status of the religious 
adjudication in different jurisdictions the effect in positive law will vary: in some European countries such 
decrees of annulment by Catholic tribunals take effect in positive law whereas in many others they operate only 
to determine religious obligations and have no civil effect (n. 56 below).
12 See generally R. Sandberg, G. Douglas, N. Doe, S. Gilliat-Ray and A. Khan, ‘Britain's religious tribunals: 
"joint governance" in practice’ (2013) 33(2) OJLS 263; G Douglas et al, ‘Marriage and Divorce in Religious 
Courts: A Case Study’ (2011) 41 Fam Law 956.
13 Zucca, A Secular Europe 123 and 128-30. Note, however, that Zucca’s preference appears to be for state 
endorsement of limited forms of religious adjudication. He writes of the danger of the alternative as a ‘black 
market’ in Sharia Law (ibid 134), whereas my discussion (below) allows for greater nuance in distinguishing 
permission from prohibition and endorsement.
14 R. Sandberg, Law and Religion, (Cambridge, 2011) 184-188. 
15 Arbitration Act 1996, s. 2(1).
16 Including one that itself applies religious law.
17 ibid s. 46(1), referring to considerations other than the rules of a national legal system.
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adjudication is therefore irregular, problematic or even unlawful. Much of the public discussion 
of Sharia Councils has in the UK has carried this implication.18 
Limiting discussion to recognition or enforcement also assumes an unduly naïve account of the 
operation of legal norms, since an important dimension is omitted, namely the position of 
religious law when it is merely permitted to operate (i.e. not prohibited) by state law. In the 
UK non-binding religious adjudication is permitted (as with Sharia Councils) but this does not 
constitute state endorsement or enforcement. The toleration of non-binding religious 
adjudication is not an argument (legal or otherwise) for or against extending binding 
adjudication and still less so in favour of parallel legal rules. Such toleration, nevertheless, 
allows for expression of religious choices and, to that extent, acknowledges pluralism. 
Although for some religionists this is second-class recognition (hence demands for more 
positive recognition), for others it goes far enough.19 
On the other hand, it is also misleading to suggest that the choice is between toleration - with 
the connotation that this amounts to state endorsement - and prohibition.20 Toleration does not 
preclude the state from education or persuasion aimed at discouraging religious adjudication. 
Positing a false alternative in this way evades an important question: why less burdensome or 
restrictive measures than prohibition would not adequately address concerns over 
discriminatory or other aspects of religious adjudication that are potentially harmful to 
vulnerable groups within religious minorities, for example women seeking religious divorces. 
It is arguable that, even if it is established that some forms of religious adjudication are, on the 
whole, harmful prohibition should be a last resort. Indeed, from some perspectives prohibition 
itself can be seen as a form of impermissible state entanglement with religion. 21
18 R. Grillo, Muslim Families, Politics and Law: A Legal Industry in Multicultural Britain (Ashgate 2016) 
(hereafter, Grillo, Muslim Families, Politics and Law) ch. 2
19 Abdullah An-Naim has argued that even in predominantly Muslim societies for the state to enforce Shari’a is 
contradictory and un-Islamic: A. An-Naim, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a 
(Harvard University Press 2008).
20 cf Malik, Minorities and the Law, 101: ‘Future debates will need to move beyond the current false binary 
between prohibition or permission to a more sophisticated analysis that develops strategies for cultural 
voluntarism and mainstreaming minority legal orders in liberal societies.’
21 There have been attempts to introduce legislation prohibiting the use of Sharia in a number of US states, 
although most of these adopt religiously neutral language (referring to ‘foreign law’ rather than religious law).
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A number of these distinctions are highly pertinent to the debate in the United Kingdom in 
recent years over Sharia Councils.22 The apparent growth in popularity of these bodies in 
settling disputes in the Islamic community, coupled with concerns over whether they deal fairly 
with women who resort to them, have provoked a variety of reactions, from calls for 
prohibition, through to proposals for their recognition, with variations on regulation or 
toleration in between.  In 2017 the then Home Secretary Theresa May, established an 
independent review chaired by Professor Mona Siddiqui, to examine the compatibility of the 
application sharia law with the law in England and Wales and ‘. … the ways in which  [it] may 
be being misused, or exploited, in a way that may discriminate against certain groups, 
undermine shared values and cause social harms’.23
Reporting in 2018, the independent review found some 90% of referrals to Sharia Councils 
were by women seeking an Islamic divorce.24  In many such cases civil divorce was not 
available because the marriage was unregistered. While the review found some evidence of 
good practice by the councils it also found clear evidence of discriminatory and unfair 
treatment of women. In its view, however, the answer was not to ban Sharia Councils (which 
it judged would be likely to be ineffective) but rather to effectively tackle the issue of the high 
proportion of Muslim marriages that were unregistered, so making recourse to Sharia Councils 
unnecessary. It therefore proposed amendments to the Marriage Act 1949 to make it an offence 
for the celebrant of a Muslim marriage to fail to register it. This, it argued, should be coupled 
with a concerted education campaign in the Muslim community to promote civil marriage. At 
the same time, it proposed that a system of self-regulation of Sharia Councils should be 
established to promote good practice. Responding in a Green paper in March 2018, the 
government undertook to further explore the reform of the law on marriage and religious 
http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/01/22/bans-on-court-use-of-shariainternational-law-south-carolina-bill-bans-sharia-
law-by-name-bills-not-reintroduced-in-at-least-three-states/  (last accessed 31 January 2019).
A similar amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution was prevented by an interim injunction on the grounds that 
it would violate the First Amendment: Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). Subsequently the District 
Court (Western District of Oklahoma) granted a permanent injunction: Awad v. Ziriax  Case No. CIV-10-1186-
M, August 15, 2013.
22 n 18 above.
23 ‘Independent Review into sharia law launched’ (Home Office press statement, 26 May 2016). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-review-into-sharia-law-launched? (last accessed 31 January 
2019). A parallel investigation by the Home Affairs Select Committee was discontinued due to the dissolution 
of Parliament for the 2017 General Election.
24 The independent review of the application of sharia law in England and Wales, Cm. 9560 (Feb. 2018).
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weddings and supported the proposals for an education campaign.25 It rejected, however, the 
review’s recommendation to encourage self-regulation by creating a body to design such a 
system comprising specialist family lawyers and Sharia Council panel members. The Green 
Paper argued that to do so would confer legitimacy upon Sharia Councils as a form of 
alternative dispute resolution and that the state should have no role in facilitating or endorsing 
this.26
The recommendations of the review contrast with the mixture of prohibition and regulation 
proposed in a series of unsuccessful private Bills moved by since 2011 by Baroness Cox in the 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill.27 That Bill aimed to prohibit sex 
discrimination in the provision of arbitration (both under the Arbitration Act 1996 and in 
‘arbitration services’) in treating the evidence of a man as worth more than that of a woman, 
or vice versa. It would also have excluded from arbitration proceedings matters falling within 
the jurisdiction of the criminal or family courts and given power to set aside negotiated 
agreements in family law if consent was not genuine; and criminalised false claims of 
jurisdiction. The overall approach was to add procedural safeguards to religious arbitration.28 
Similar reasoning underlay the (rejected) Boyd proposals in the Canadian province of 
Ontario.29 The debate resulting from the report’s proposals ended, however, in the prohibition 
of faith- based family arbitration, following the introduction of regulations limiting recognized 
family arbitration agreements to those conducted in accordance with civil law.30 
25 HM Government, Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper: Building stronger more united communities 
(March 2018).
26 ibid 58. See also: The independent review of the application of sharia law in England and Wales, 20 
(Dissenting view on regulation).
27 Grillo, Muslim Families, Politics and Law ch.7. 
28 Although critics doubted what it would have added to the common law or the Arbitration Act 1996: J. 
Eekelaar, ‘The Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill’ [2011] Family Law 1209.
29 M. Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion (Attorney-General of 
Ontario 2004).Available at: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf 
(last accessed 31 January 2019).
30 Ontario Reg 134/07, s. 4(1).  See also: M. Boyd, ‘Ontario’s ‘shari’a court’: Law and Politics Intertwined’ in 
Griffith-Jones  Islam and English Law;  N. Bakht, ‘Were Muslim barbarians really knocking on the gates of 
Ontario? The religious arbitration controversy - another perspective’, (2005) 40 Ottawa Law Review 67-82; L. 
Weinrib, ‘Ontario’s Sharia Law Debate: Law and Politics under the Charter’ in R Moon (ed), Law and Religious 
Pluralism in Canada (UCB Press 2008) 250; A. Schachar , ‘Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from 
Religious Arbitration in Family Law’, (2008) 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 573-607.
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Critics of the recognition of religious law often allege that recognition poses a threat to the 
unity or sovereignty of state law.31 In a strict sense, arguments of this kind rest on a 
misunderstanding.  Recognition of plural religious systems is, fundamentally contractual in 
nature- the norms enforced are the parties’ religious norms, rather than norms promulgated by 
the state. Even in jurisdictions where parallel systems operate the ‘one law for all’ criticism is 
arguably incorrect since invariably there are complex ground rules for establishing the primacy 
of constitutional or procedural norms.32 Following a Hartian approach, such arrangements can 
be understood as a ranking of sources of law, rather than a partition of the legal system.33 But 
to suggest that recognition of plural systems in western states involves anything as fundamental 
as change to the rule of recognition is simply mistaken. For the same reason it would be equally 
misconceived for advocates of religious law to argue from the existence of permitted forms of 
plural law that the refusal to adopt a parallel system is inconsistent or somehow discriminatory. 
Allowing to operate adjudicative mechanisms for moral and religious norms that are binding 
in conscience does not commit the state to enact or otherwise endorse these norms as positive 
law.
It is common ground among many commentators that whatever form of recognition may be 
given to religious adjudication, human rights (especially those of women within religious 
communities) must be protected.34 This concession is made in order to overcome what one 
influential author, Ayelet Shachar, calls the ‘either/or’ ‘your culture or your rights’ dilemma 
that accommodation of religious difference within liberal societies otherwise appears to 
present.35 Notwithstanding such consensus detailed exploration of the human rights 
compatibility of religious adjudication remains a largely unexplored dimension to the debate 
about recognition of religious law. Without knowing whether or how the human rights proviso 
31 e.g. D. Green (ed.) Sharia Law or ‘One Law For All?’(Civitas, London 2009) 1-7. 
32 R. Hirshl, Constitutional Theocracy (Harvard University Press 2010) ch. 4.  Hischl and Shachar comment: ‘In 
countries that . … grant religious or customary communities some degree of jurisdictional autonomy . … 
clashes over the scope of authority and the “chain of command” between constitutional courts and religious 
tribunals seem inevitable.’ Hischl and Shachar, ‘Competing Orders’, 437.
33 See  H..L.A. Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961) ch.6 for discussion of the rule of recognition.
34  T. Modood, ‘Multicultural Citizenship and the Shari’a Controversy in Britain’ in R Ahdar and N Aroney 
(eds) Shari’a in the West, (Oxford University Press, 2010) (hereafter, Ahdar and Aroney Shari’a in the West) 
38; J. Waldron, ‘Questions about the Reasonable Accommodation of Minorities’ in Ahdar and Aroney Shari’a 
in the West 133.
35 A Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge University 
Press 2001) (hereafter, Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions) 113-4.
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would work in the case of specific human rights in specific legal systems it will never be clear 
if it offers a real solution to the ‘either/ or’ dilemma or merely a false hope that religious 
minorities can keep their culture and have their rights. As Jean-Francois Gauderault-DesBiens 
has argued, claims for the recognition of religious courts in liberal states must be considered 
‘in concreto’ against ‘country-specific expressions of legal traditions’.36 In that spirit 
discussion now turns to the compatibility of different forms of religious adjudication with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. As we shall see in the next section the European Court 
of Human Rights has considered several specific forms of state  relations to religious law and 
from this jurisprudence further deductions can be made about its probable approach to other 
models that it has not so far encountered.
III. Recognition under the European Convention
In this section two specific questions are addressed. Firstly, whether there are human rights- 
based reasons to recognize religious adjudication as a manifestation of the right of freedom of 
belief and religion (either individually or collectively).  Secondly, whether any such 
recognition must be subject to compliance with procedural human rights standards (in 
particular, the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 
ECHR). 
Religious Autonomy and Religious Law 
The self-governance of religious communities is an important aspect of collective freedom of 
religion and belief. This entails freedom to associate with other like-minded religionists, and 
self-governance according to religious norms free from state interference follows from this. 
These norms typically involve such important aspects of communal and family life, including 
membership, admission, discipline and expulsion from religious communities, recognition of 
family events such as marriage, divorce, maturity into adulthood and the acceptance of children 
into full membership, inheritance as well as questions such as dietary observance.
International human rights law clearly recognises the collective dimension to religious liberty 
including, as a consequence, the autonomy of religious communities. It is far from clear, 
36 J-F Gauderault-DesBiens, ‘Religious Courts, Personal Federalism and Legal Transplants’ in Ahdar and 
Aroney, Shari’a in the West at 177.
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however, that recognition of religious adjudication is regarded as an essential aspect of 
religious autonomy. There is no mention of the recognition of religious adjudication as such in 
several of the key international texts dealing with religious autonomy; it does not feature, for 
example, in the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 22,37 in the 1981 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief38 or in the main relevant Council of Europe resolution.39 Nevertheless some 
writers argue that the protected manifestation of belief at the collective level entails a right to 
observe and apply religious law in community and to establish religious tribunals.40 
Although there has been a growing recognition of the importance of religious autonomy as 
contributing to pluralism in its jurisprudence41 the European Court of Human Rights has not 
to date endorsed an autonomous sphere for religious law. The Article 9 jurisprudence on 
religious autonomy has led to a limited recognition of a sphere of religious decision-making 
in which the state must not interfere: in choice of religious leadership,42 resolution of 
doctrinal disputes43 and the exercise of religious discipline.44 In these fields, two lines of 
argument - based on separation from state institutions and on consent- have come together 
in favour of recognition of an autonomous sphere. Where religious autonomy comes into 
conflict with other Convention rights, however, the state has a duty to balance autonomy 
37 General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18): 30/07/1993. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22. (General Comments).
38 UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981). The Declaration was adopted by General Assembly Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 51), 171.
39 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1086, adopted 6 October 1988.
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta88/erec1086.htm 
40 See citations in A. Scolnicov, The Right to Religious Freedom in International Law: Between Group Rights 
and Individual Rights (London 2011) 130.
41 In its leading decision Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia (2007) 44 EHRR 46. the Court avowed:
 ‘ [T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and 
is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. . … Certainly States have a right to 
satisfy themselves that an association's aim and activities are in conformity with the rules laid down in legislation, 
but they must do so in a manner compatible with their obligations under the Convention and subject to review by 
the Convention institutions’.
42 Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy and Ors v Bulgaria Apps no 412/03 
& 35677/ 04 (ECtHR, 22 January 2009); Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (2000) 34 EHRR 55; Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia v Moldova App no 45701/99 (ECtHR, 13 December 2001); and Mirolubovs v Latvia,App 
no 798/05  (ECtHR, 15 September 2009).
43 Freedom of religion ‘excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or 
the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate’: Manoussakis v. Greece, (1996) 23 EHRR. 387, 400-01.
44 See further, text at n. 82 below.
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with other rights.45     
The Court’s treatment of arguments for the recognition of religious law under human rights 
law has been lukewarm at best. For example, in 2011 the Grand Chamber found no violation 
of Articles 8 or 14 from the failure in Turkey to give legal recognition to a purely religious 
marriage or from the treatment of it as different to a civil marriage.46 Similarly, in Chbihi 
Loudoudi and Others v. Belgium47 the failure of the Belgian authorities to allow the applicants 
to legally adopt their Moroccan niece, for whom they were caring under kafala (a voluntary 
undertaking in Islamic law to provide for a child’s welfare, education and protection), was 
found not to violate Article 8. Nor has the Court been especially sympathetic to claims that 
individuals have a right to manifest their beliefs grounded on adherence to religious law. When 
faced with a claim by ultra-orthodox Jews that the restricted system of licensing in France 
interfered with their ability to obtain meat slaughtered in accordance with their religious dietary 
laws (glatt meat) the Court was anything but accommodating. The majority found that there 
was no violation of Article 9 since the applicants could obtain glatt meat by importing it.48 The 
outcome would suggest that there is no general Convention duty to facilitate observance of 
religious law, 49 and this has been explicitly confirmed by the Grand Chamber in the recent 
Molla Sali decision, considered below.50
Overall the Convention approach allows for recognition of religious autonomy within a liberal 
framework based on universal legal and human rights values. This recognition is thus largely 
45 Fernández Martínez v. Spain App no 6030/07 (ECtHR, 12 June 2014), Grand Chamber. See further Part V 
below.
46 Serife Yigit v. Turkey (2011) 53 EHRR 25.  The Court has also found an application to challenge Malta’s 
refusal to recognise a religious annulment of marriage following conversion to Islam and subsequent remarriage 
according to Libyan law to be inadmissible, since it did not violate Articles 8 or 14 and was within the state’s 
margin of appreciation: Green & Farhat v Malta App no 38797/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010). 
47 Chbihi Loudoudi and Others v. Belgium App no 52265/10 (ECtHR, 16 Dec. 2014); see also Harroudj v. 
France App no 43631/09 (ECtHR, 4 Oct. 2012).
48 Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France App no 27417/95 (ECtHR, 27 June 
2000), Grand Chamber, paras.80–83. This ‘absolved’ the Court from determining the Art. 9(2) question, but the 
majority went on to find that that provision would have been satisfied, having regard to the state’s margin of 
appreciation (ibid para.84). A minority found the possibility of obtaining glatt meat by other means ‘to be 
irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the scope of an act or omission on the part of the State aimed, as in the 
present case, at restricting exercise of the right to freedom of religion’: Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sir 
Nicolas Bratza, Fischbach, Thomassen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Pantiru, Levits and Traja, ibid para. 1.
49 In the strictly regulated context of a prison, however, the Court has recognised that a failure by the authorities 
to accommodate a prisoner’s Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules violated his rights under Article 9: Jakobski v. 
Poland App no 18429/06 (ECtHR, 7 December 2010).
50 Part IV below.
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confined to a distinct religious sphere and is hostile to a stronger version of pluralism. More 
detailed consideration of the human-rights compatibility of religious adjudication can be found 
in in a small group of decisions applying Article 6 (the right to fair trial before an independent 
and impartial tribunal) to religious adjudication.
Procedural Standards, Human Rights and Religious Adjudication
The underlying rationale for the imposition of procedural standards on religious adjudication 
is that legal recognition is a privilege: the price of enjoyment is following recognised 
procedural rules. Conversely the state should not endorse procedural impropriety by permitting 
legally recognised bodies to behave arbitrarily in determining disputes or delegate its authority 
to those that do so.51 In terms of the discussion of different degrees of recognition in Part II, 
these arguments are at the their strongest in the cases of parallel systems and state enforced 
arbitration. Consequently, the UN Human Rights Committee has argued that the right to a fair 
trial applies to religious courts recognized by or entrusted with judicial tasks by the state and 
that recognition can only be compatible with Article 14 of International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights if:
‘. …proceedings before such courts are limited to minor civil and criminal matters, meet 
the basic requirements of fair trial and other relevant guarantees of the Covenant, and 
their judgments are validated by State courts in light of the guarantees set out in the 
Covenant and can be challenged by the parties concerned in a procedure meeting the 
requirements of article 14…’52
51 There is some support for this position from the Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the reach of the ECHR 
to decisions of ecclesiastical bodies that are adopted by state courts: see the Pellegrini and Lombardi Vallauri 
decisions of the ECtHR, discussed below.
52 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 32 Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals 
and to a fair trial (CCPR/C/GC/32, 23 August 2007; Human Rights Committee, Ninetieth session, Geneva, 9 to 
27 July 2007), para. 24. 
In relation to a complaint against Sudan under the African Charter of Rights concerning the operation of Shari’a 
Courts the African Commission of Human Rights has determined:
‘When Sudanese tribunals apply Shari'a, they must do so in accordance with the other obligations 
undertaken by the State of Sudan. Trials must always accord with international fair-trial standards. Also, it 
is fundamentally unjust that religious laws should be applied against non-adherents of the religion. 
Tribunals that apply only Shari'a are thus not competent to judge non-Muslims, and everyone should have 
the right to be tried by a secular court if they so wish.’ 
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Nonetheless, there are a number of practical questions that may arise in other forms of religious 
adjudication, especially those operating in close-knit religious communities. It is noteworthy 
therefore that in 2016 the Equality and Human Rights Commission highlighted the importance 
of Article 6 ECHR in its submission to the independent review of Sharia Councils in England 
and Wales.53 The Commission emphasised the need for individuals to have ‘a good 
understanding of what their legal rights and responsibilities are, to know how to access an 
independent tribunal, and the financial and practical means to do so’ and drew attention to the 
language barriers that may affect women using Sharia Councils. 54
Under the ECHR the question of procedural standards for religious decision-making has arisen 
exclusively to date concerning the applicability of the Convention to ecclesiastical authorities 
in Christian denominations. Systems of canon law remain in many European states as a relic 
of what historically was a much broader jurisdiction, extending not only to clergy but also to 
the laity. In some countries legislative and constitutional provisions recognise these systems; 
mostly these refer to internal religious affairs but there are also some states that recognise a 
broader ecclesiastical jurisdiction, specifically when it comes to the annulment of religious 
marriages.55 Annulments of these marriages by Catholic tribunals are recognised in civil law 
in Portugal, Malta, Italy and Spain under the terms of agreements with the Holy See.56 By 
contrast, in the UK ecclesiastical courts are now are only concerned with internal church 
affairs.57 The approach taken at Strasbourg to these long-established features of the European 
legal order can help to shed light on how the newer questions raised by religious arbitration, 
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Communications 48/90-50/91-52/91-89/93, Amnesty 
International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the 
Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan, Thirteenth Activity Report 1999-2000, Annex V, para.73.
53 See further Part II above.
54 Response of the Equality and Human Rights Commission to the Consultation: Review into the application of 
sharia law in England and Wales (2016), paras. 8 and 9. 
55 N. Doe, Law and Religion in Europe (Oxford 2011) 223-26 and 132-34 discussing recognition of legislative 
and judicial autonomy for religious organizations; and see M. Rynkowski, ‘Could the ecclesiastical courts 
submit the demand for a “preliminary ruling” to the European Court of Justice?’ (2009) IV Derecho Y Religión 
59.
56 Doe, Law and Religion in Europe, 224. In the case of Italy, a further summary application is necessary to a 
State court of appeal, which is required to determine that the ecclesiastical tribunal had jurisdiction and that 
requirements of Italian law have been fulfilled; and see Pellegrini v. Italy (2002) 35 EHRR 2, discussed below.
57 For the law of the Church of England: M. Hill, Ecclesiastical Law (4th ed., Oxford, 2018); N. Doe, The Legal 
Framework of the Church of England (Oxford, 1996).
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for example among Jewish and Muslim communities, might be tackled within the Convention 
framework.
The main Convention requirement of relevance is Article 6(1):
‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. ….’.
A straightforward example demonstrates the application of Article 6 to adjudication by 
religious tribunals. In Launikari v Finland58 a minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Finland successfully challenged the excessive length of the domestic proceedings in which he 
sought to challenge his dismissal for having acted in breach of his official duties. Finnish law 
gave a right to appeal to the Suprem  Administrative Court from the National Church Board 
but because of complex jurisdictional issues proceedings in the applicant’s case took more than 
six years, resulting in a denial of the right of fair trial, the European Court of Human Rights 
found. Similarly, the total exclusion of access to civil courts in favour of a state-imposed system 
of religious arbitration to deal with property disputes between Greek Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic churches following the dissolution of Greek Catholic Church in Romania has been 
found to violate Article 6.59 
There is, however, a significant constraint of the usefulness of Article 6 in relation to religious 
adjudication, arising from the parasitical approach that the Strasbourg court takes towards the 
definition of a civil right. It is a settled feature of the Article 6 jurisprudence that it does not 
permit the secretion of new rights into the national legal order under the guise of procedural 
protection. Consequently, if there is an existing recognised right under domestic law (or an 
arguable case for one) Article 6 will apply, but if there is none it will not. 
The application of these principles was contested in Károly Nagy v. Hungary60 where the Grand 
Chamber found by a majority of 10:7 that there had been no violation of Article 6 when the 
58 App no 34120/96 (ECtHR, 5 October 2000).
59 Sâmbata Bihor Greek Catholic Parish v Romania App no 48107/99 (ECtHR, 12 January 2010).
60 Károly Nagy v. Hungary, App 56665/09 (ECtHR, 14 September 2017) (Grand Chamber).
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applicant (a former priest in the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Hungary) had been unable to 
bring a claim in the secular courts for unpaid allowances during a period when he was 
suspended. His claims both in the employment courts and in contract had been dismissed since 
these were matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts (where he had 
chosen not to bring a claim). The Hungarian courts had applied the statutory limitations under 
the Church Act 1990 and the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, according to 
which there was no civil cause of action. The majority of the Grand Chamber held therefore 
that was no relevant civil right for the purpose of Article 6.61 The dissenting judges emphasised, 
however, the danger that a too restrictive approach to Article 6 risked conferring immunity on 
the religious authorities.62 Judges Sajó, Lopez Guerra, Tsotsoria and Laffranque criticized what 
they regarded as an over generous approach towards religious autonomy, which effectively 
deprived the applicant of due judicial protection under the Convention.63  Similarly, Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque concluded that the Hungarian position was disproportionate, based on a 
comparative survey of 39 Council of Europe states which showed that only 7 completely 
excluded any jurisdiction of State courts to examine pecuniary claims by the clergy.64
It follows also from the Strasbourg approach that even where it is clear that a civil right exists 
the depth of human rights scrutiny under Article 6 will be constrained by the standard of review 
applied under domestic law. Thus, in Müller v. Germany 65 the Court found that Article 6 was 
applicable to the dismissal of the applicants by the Salvation Army because since 2000 German 
Federal Court of Justice had established a new line of caselaw allowing for limited review of 
whether such decisions arbitrary or contrary to public policy or morals. However, since it 
61 ibid paras. 60-61. The same approach has been followed in several other decisions: Dudová and Duda v. the 
Czech Republic, App no. 40224/98 (ECtHR, 30 January 2001) (no right in Czech law for member of the Hussite 
church to challenge lawfulness of dismissal); Ahtinen v. Finland, (2009) 49 EHRR. 47 (no right in Finnish law 
for a priest in the Evangelical Lutheran Church to challenge his transfer); Baudler v. Germany App, no. 
38254/04 (ECtHR, 6 December 2011) (no right under German law engaging Art 6 ECHR in the Protestant 
Church placing the applicant on enforced leave of absence: decision governed solely by ecclesiastical law and 
not subject to review by state administrative courts); Reuter v. Germany App no. 39775/04 (ECtHR, 6 
December 2011) (finding by German administrative courts that financial consequences of church’s decision to 
oblige the applicant to take early retirement was not within their jurisdiction did not violate Art 6).
62 Judge Sicilianos argued that the majority had applied an over-stringent view of an ‘arguable case’ in their 
finding that Art. 6 did not apply: Károly Nagy v. Hungary, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sicilianos; Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque argued that Article 6 was applicable since the Hungarian Supreme Court had, in his view, failed 
to assess the applicant’s legal claim and had granted de facto legal immunity to the Church: ibid Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.
63 Ibid Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajo, Lopez Guerra, Tsotsoria and Laffranque.
64 Ibid Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.
65 Müller v. Germany App, no. 12986/04 (ECtHR, 6 December 2011).
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concluded that this standard had been applied, the Court found there was no violation of Article 
6.
In cases where it is found that that Article 6 applies, there is also some scope to adapt its 
requirements,66 taking account of the religious institutional setting in which dispute resolution 
occurs. When it comes to challenging the impartiality of state-recognised clergy disciplinary 
processes a flexible interpretation of Article 6 has been adopted at Strasbourg. In Tyler v UK67 
the Commission found that the composition of the courts (appointed by church authorities) to 
hear proceedings against an Anglican clergyman for ‘conduct unbecoming’ did not breach the 
requirement for ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’. In the Commission’s view it was 
appropriate for disciplinary matters to be dealt with by a tribunal containing representation 
from the body concerned.68 The European Court of Human Rights has cited the risk of 
interfering with religious autonomy as a  reason for finding that Article 6 (1) did not apply to 
proceedings in which priests of the Czechoslovak Hussite Church challenged termination by 
the church authorities of their clerical service.69 The question of waiver of rights or consent by 
a party to a procedure that might otherwise be taken to violate Article 6 is also significant.  
Nevertheless, if an applicant can negotiate these hurdles there are principles under the Article 
6 jurisprudence which are of potential importance in religious adjudication, in particular as 
regards the composition of the tribunal, under the ‘equality of arms’ principle70 and the need 
for reasoned decision-making.71 
Not surprisingly the European Court of Human Rights has been less willing to allow deviations 
from procedural standards on grounds of religious autonomy in situations where a religious 
body in effect stands in the place of a state body to make a determination affecting a lay 
66 D. Harris, M.O’Boyle, E.Bates and C.Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed., 
Oxford, 2009) ch. 6. 
67 App no 000212183/83 (ECtHR, 5 April 1994).
68 The Commission also noted that there were other relevant guarantees of judicial independence. In dismissing 
the applicant’s attack on the composition of the consistory court, it stressed that the chancellor’s appointment 
was permanent and was subject only to removal in exceptional circumstances and there was a requirement that 
he or she be a qualified lawyer and swear a judicial oath. There was no reason to assume that the 4 assessors 
(two clergy and two lay) were not independent. The Commission similarly rejected challenges to the Dean and 
other members of the Court of Arches.
69 Dudová and Duda v Czech Republic App no 40224/98 (ECtHR, Jan 30, 2001).
70 ‘This. …requires each party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do 
not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent.’ D. Harris, M.O’Boyle, E.Bates and 
C.Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 251.
71ibid 269.
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person’s general legal rights.72 It has therefore applied Article 6 to decisions of a religious body 
recognised by other state institutions as affecting the applicant’s rights, since it is the state’s 
duty to ensure that such bodies observe the requirements of the right to fair trial.73 Thus, in 
Pellegrini v Italy74 the Court held that the Article 6 had been breached when the Italian civil 
courts, acting under the terms of the Concordat with the Holy See, endorsed a decree of nullity 
obtained by the applicant’s husband in a Vatican ecclesiastical court.75 It found that the Italian 
courts had failed to adequately verify compliance with Article 6 by the ecclesiastical courts 
prior to executing the decree. Scrutiny was required because the Vatican was not a signatory 
to the Convention and because of the importance of the matter for the parties. The equality of 
arms principle had been breached because the conditions under which the initial hearing had 
taken place: the applicant was not aware of the nullity proceedings instituted by her husband 
until she responded to a summons to be questioned in the ecclesiastical court, had no legal 
representation and had not been informed that a declaration of nullity would seriously affect 
her entitlement to maintenance.76
72 For instance, where annulments of marriage pronounced by Catholic authorities have civil law status, as in 
Portugal, Malta, Spain and Italy: N. Doe, Law and Religion in Europe (Oxford, 2011) 224.
73 Where an ecclesiastical body has jurisdiction over matters affecting a person’s civil rights its own procedure 
must either conform to Art. 6 or it must be subject to subsequent control by a judicial body having full 
jurisdiction and providing Article 6 safeguards. See Helle v Finland App no 20772/92 (ECtHR, 19 April 1997), 
in which the Court noted that because a Cathedral Chapter’s decisions were subject to the control of the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court, which was an independent and impartial tribunal with full appellate jurisdiction 
to review its decisions, this satisfied Article 6 (ibid paras. 45 and 46). cf Károly Nagy v. Hungary, App 
56665/09 (ECtHR, 14 September 2017) (Grand Chamber), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, 
para. 41.
74 Pellegrini v Italy (2002) 35 EHRR 2. 
75 As second cousins the couple were within the prohibited degrees of kindred and the officiating priest had 
failed to obtain the necessary dispensation before their canon law ceremony of marriage.
76 Contrast Eskinazi v Turkey App no 14600/05 (ECtHR, 6 December 2005) an admissibility decision in which 
the Court found there was no violation of Art. 6 arising from an order by the Turkish courts for the return of the 
applicant and her daughter to Israel, following a request made under the Hague Abduction Convention 1980 by 
a rabbinical court in Tel Aviv in religious divorce proceedings brought by her husband. Under Israeli law the 
decision to contract a religious marriage resulted in the rabbinical court having exclusive jurisdiction over the 
divorce proceedings (including custody), subject to the supervision of the Israeli Supreme Court. The applicant 
claimed that she would not receive a fair trial because of the religious nature of the rabbinical court, which did 
not provide the same fundamental guarantees relating to public policy as a secular court. In particular, she 
pointed to its tendency to interpret the best interests of the child in the light of religious principles. 
Distinguishing Pellegrini, the ECtHR found, that the responsibility of the Turkish courts (Israel is not party to 
the ECHR) under Art. 6 at such a preliminary stage of the proceedings was limited. It also rejected the claim 
that the religious nature of the rabbinical court was incompatible per se with Article 6 (ibid 26). While noting 
some misgivings, the Court emphasised assurances given by the Israeli government about the conformity of the 
rabbinical courts’ practice with international law and the power of review of the Supreme Court to correct any 
flagrant denial of justice (ibid 27-28). Moreover, that the applicant fell under the jurisdiction of the rabbinical 
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From this initial discussion of the recognition of religious adjudication under the Convention 
we move now to a closer analysis of how different forms of adjudication are treated, beginning 
with the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to parallel systems.
V. The European Convention and Parallel Systems77 
The human rights’ compatibility of a proposed parallel form of religious law was considered 
indirectly by the Grand Chamber in the controversial Refah Partisi decision when it ruled that 
steps taken by Turkey against a political party with such an agenda did not violate Articles 9 
or 11. The Court found that to implement state endorsement of Shari’a law in Turkey 
(according to which Muslims would be bound in private law matters) would violate the  
Convention.78 A system in which an individual’s rights and obligations differed according to 
their religion would abrogate the state’s responsibility to guarantee religious liberty and would 
be discriminatory, contrary to Article 14. Moreover: 
‘[S]uch a difference in treatment cannot maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, 
the claims of certain religious groups who wish to be governed by their own rules and on 
the other the interest of society as a whole, which must be based on peace and on 
tolerance between the various religions and beliefs. …..’79 
Consequently, there was no violation of Article 9 in the prohibition of Refah Partisi for 
unconstitutional activities. The Grand Chamber characterised the party’s policy as applying 
precepts of Shari’a law to the majority population (Muslims) within the framework of a 
plurality of legal systems. This programme was beyond the protection of freedom of religion 
under Article 9 of as a matter of individual conscience since it assigned private law obligations 
according to membership of a religious group.80 Despite the Grand Chamber’s reference to 
plurality its approach suggests that this better understood as a decision about parallel legal 
systems. Certainly, although not fully developed in the judgment, lack of consent appears to be 
court was a consequence of her own decision to contract a religious marriage in Tel Aviv (in addition to her 
civil marriage under French law): ibid 27. 
77In this section I treat the Refah Partisi and Molla Sali decisions as examples of parallelism because, despite 
some references to plural systems in the judgments, it is clear that the Court itself regards them involving non-
consensual, state imposed, religious norms.
78 Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 1, 33.
79 ibid para.119.
80 Esp., paras. 127 and 128.
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central to this aspect of the ruling, suggesting that the position of genuinely supplementary 
religious legal systems remains open.81
Refah Partisi concerned a proposed parallel system that was never implemented but in Molla 
Sali v. Greece82 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confronted the 
operation in practice of the few systems of plural religious law within the Council of Europe - 
the inheritance law of the province of Western Thrace. This provided for succession disputes 
involving members of the Muslim community to fall under the jurisdiction of the local mufti.83 
The system was a continuation of the arrangements for religious minorities in their respective 
countries made between Greece and Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. In this instance 
the complaint to the European Court of Human Rights arose from the decision of the Greek 
courts to disregard the disposition to the petitioner by her late husband’s will of his entire estate, 
in favour of a distribution of property according to intestacy under Sharia law. The result was 
that close relatives (her husband’s surviving sisters) were entitled to three-quarters and that the 
widow received one quarter of the estate. Her complaint alleged violations of her rights under 
Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right of property), Article 6 (the right to fair trial) and Article 
14 (non-discrimination, inter alia, on grounds of religion). However, the Grand Chamber chose 
to in effect disregard her Article 6 arguments and to focus on what it considered to be the 
central question: ‘whether there was a difference in treatment potentially amounting to 
discrimination as compared with the application of the law of succession. … to those seeking 
to benefit from a will as drawn up by a testator who was not of Muslim faith.’84 It concluded 
that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol 1.
81 The Grand Chamber demurred from expressing an opinion in the abstract about the plurality of legal systems: 
ibid para. 127.In his concurring opinion Judge Kolver regretted that the Grand Chamber had not taken up this 
opportunity: ibid Concurring Opinion of Judge Kolver.
82 Molla Sali v. Greece App no 20452/14 (ECtHR, 19 December 2018), Grand Chamber.
83 A mufti is a Greek civil servant holding the rank of Director-General of Administration who is appointed by 
presidential decree on a proposal by the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs (para. 39). Human rights 
questions concerning the appointment of the mufti had previously featured in Serif v. Greece (2000) 31 EHRR 
20 in which European Court of Human Rights held that the applicant’s conviction, despite being elected by the 
local Muslim population, for the offence of usurping the functions of a mufti was an infringement of Art. 9. The 
Greek government’s claim that it was necessary to have a single mufti appointed by it to prevent religious 
tension was rejected. See also Agga v. Greece Apps. no 50776/99 and 52912/99 (ECtHR, 17 October 2002); 
Agga v. Greece (no. 3) App no 32186/02 (ECtHR, 13 July 2006).
84 Molla Sali v Greece, para. 86. With regard to Art. 6 the applicant had argued that by disregarding the terms of 
a will made under the Civil Code that the Greek courts had denied her the benefit of the application of the 
ordinary law and had applied instead Sharia Law.
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In its analysis under Article 14 the Grand Chamber compared the position of the applicant, as 
a married woman who was a beneficiary of her Muslim husband’s will, to the position of a 
married female beneficiary of a non-Muslim husband’s will.85 A wife in this position would 
naturally expect that on her husband’s death his estate would be settled in accordance with his 
will. Although the lower Greek courts had upheld the will as a valid under the provisions of 
the Civil Code, the Court of Cassation had overturned these judgments and found that the 
relevant law was the Islamic law applicable in Greece. Applying Islamic law, the estate fell 
into the category of mulkia the and the will was consequently void. The outcome was that the 
applicant had been treated differently to a married female beneficiary of the will of a non-
Muslim husband. Article 14 was therefore engaged. 
From this starting point, in accordance with the Article 14 jurisprudence, the Grand Chamber 
went on to consider whether the discrimination pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate. 
The Grand Chamber doubted the Gre k government’s assertion that the  case-law of the Court 
of Cassation as applied in this instance was suited to the avowed aim of the protection of the 
Thrace Muslim minority.86 However, the Grand Chamber preferred not to resolve that question 
in the light of its finding that the difference in treatment was not proportionate to this aim, 
bearing in mind the serious consequences for the applicant.
The Grand Chamber rejected the Greek government’s contention that it was necessary for the 
courts to treat the will as devoid of effect in order to give effect to the international obligations 
to protect the Muslim community. It noted that, while under the Treaties of Sèvres and 
Lausanne Greece undertook to respect the customs of the Muslim minority, it was not obliged 
under these provisions to apply Sharia law. The Treaty of Sèvres was no longer in force. The 
Treaty of Lausanne guaranteed the religious distinctiveness of the Greek Muslim community 
but did not specifically mention the mufti or any other special body with jurisdiction over 
religious practices.87 
In a key passage the Grand Chamber stated that:
85 ibid paras. 138-141.
86 ibid para. 143.
87 ibid para. 151.
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. … according to its case-law, freedom of religion does not require the Contracting States 
to create a particular legal framework in order to grant religious communities a special 
status entailing specific privileges. Nevertheless, a State which has created such a status 
must ensure that the criteria established for a group’s entitlement to it are applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner.  …88
It was noteworthy therefore that there were differences of opinion among the Greek courts over 
whether the application of Sharia law was compatible with the principle of equal treatment and 
with international human rights standards.89 Moreover, a number of international bodies had 
expressed concerns about whether the application of Sharia law to matters concerning family 
law and inheritance was compatible with Greece’s human rights obligations, including those 
relating to the rights of the child and women’s rights.90 
Molla Sali v Greece was not the first decision in which the European Court of Human Rights 
has chosen to apply Article 14 in this way in preference to an applicant’s formulation of their 
claim. In its 2010 decision in Serife Yigit v Turkey the Grand Chamber took a similar path under 
Art 14 rather than primarily under Art 8 (as had the Chamber). It held that the non-recognition 
of the applicant’s religious marriage (no civil marriage had been conducted) was justified by 
the Turkish policy of giving primacy to civil marriage for the protection of women (e.g. to 
prevent polygamy) and to uphold the secular nature of the Turkish republic. In a case like Serife 
Yigit raising a claim for infringement of a qualified right like Article 8 there may be little 
practical difference to analysis of the facts under Article 14 since questions of legitimacy of 
88 ibid para. 155.
89 ibid paras. 48-53.
90 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the seventh 
periodic report by Greece, adopted at its fifty-fourth session (11 February – 1 March 2013), paras. 36 and 
37; UN Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the 
Covenant, 25 April 2005, para. 8; Report by Thomas Hammerberg  Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe following his visit to Greece from 8 to 10 December 2008, Issued Reviewed: Human Rights 
of Minorities, paras. 33-36 and 41; Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, Freedom of religion and other human rights of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and of the Muslim 
minority in Thrace (eastern Greece), (21 April 2009), para. 55; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Compatibility of Sharia law with the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Can States Parties to the Convention be signatories of the ‘Cairo Convention’?,, 
Introductory Memorandum (Rapp. Ms. Merixtell Mateu), AS/JUR (2016) 28 (7 October 2016), para. 43. 
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aim and proportionality are relevant to both in any event. There is, however, potentially a 
greater difference in approach compared to Article 6, where these structured tests do not apply. 
Analysis under Article 6 has allowed the Court to address alleged procedural problems in the 
application of religious law, as noted in Part IV. However, plainly substantive human rights 
infringements cannot be addressed in this fashion. 
The use of Article 14 is undoubtedly encouraged by the broad-brush criticisms levelled at 
Sharia in the Refah Partisi case. These comments have themselves been criticised as unhelpful 
by commentators. 91 To an extent the Grand Chamber’s decision in Molla Sali is open to the   
same criticism. For example, in places it ranges over the broader discriminatory effect of Sharia 
(referring to women generally and to children), rather than focusing solely on the relevant 
comparison in treatment under Article 14 that the court itself had identified.92 The Court’s 
preference for Art. 14 makes it difficult to envisage circumstances under which a state be able 
to satisfy the reasonable and objective criterion for a difference in treatment under religious 
law.93
Referring back to the discussion in Part II above, the objection to enforcing religious law 
because of its discriminatory impact primarily relates to the content of the norms rather than to 
adjudication as such. Not surprisingly therefore they have arisen in relation to parallel systems 
– the Grand Chamber treated Western Thrace as one in effect- rather than plural systems, as 
defined above. 
The Court’s preference for using Article 14 perhaps implies that plural systems would 
encounter fewer difficulties from the point of view of Article 6.  It should be borne in mind, 
however, that there also some procedural norms affecting religious adjudication that might 
91 D McGoldrick, ‘Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia Law to Religiously Based Opt 
Outs from Generally Applicable Laws’ (2009) 9 HRL Rev 603; D McGoldrick, ‘The compatibility of an 
Islamic/shari'a law system or shari'a rules with the European Convention on Human Rights’, in R Griffith-
Jones (ed), Islam and English Law: rights, responsibilities and the place of shari'a (Cambridge 2013) 42-71.
92 e.g. Molla Sali v Greece, para. 154.
93 In Refah Partisi the Grand Chamber stated:’. … Turkey, like any other Contracting Party, may legitimately 
prevent the application within its jurisdiction of private-law rules of religious inspiration prejudicial to public 
order and the values of democracy for Convention purposes (such as rules permitting discrimination based on 
the gender of the parties concerned, as in polygamy and privileges for the male sex in matters of divorce and 
succession). The freedom to enter into contracts cannot encroach upon the State’s role as the neutral and 
impartial organiser of the exercise of religions, faiths and beliefs . …’ (Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 
1, para. 128).
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trigger Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6.  For example, under Islamic law different 
weight may be given to the testimony of men and women94 while under Jewish law women are 
not regarded as fully qualified to give evidence in court and cannot be appointed as rabbis or 
judges.95 In the case of truly voluntary religious adjudication this would not be a question of 
the state creating a discriminatory system. Nonetheless a civil court that recognised a religious 
determination would have a responsibility under Article 6 ECHR to ensure that the right to fair 
trial was not infringed by such practices.96
The Molla Sali decision raises two further questions that merit further discussion, namely, the 
extent to which national courts should defer to religious adjudicators and the relevance of 
consent within religious communities to human rights protection. These are examined in the 
Parts V and VI below. 
V. Judicial Scrutiny and Deference
Although the Grand Chamber in Molla Sali v Greece choose to approach the case through the 
prism of discrimination under Article 14 it is nonetheless revealing to consider why the 
applicant had claimed that her right to a fair trial under Article 6 had been violated. In essence 
her argument was that the Greek courts had declined to apply the ordinary law under the Civil 
Code (under which her husband’s will was valid) and instead had misapplied a Sharia law 
concept (‘property in full ownership’) to remit the case to the jurisdiction of the mufti. 
The underlying question was that of who had competence to determine the legal questions and 
the degree of deference owed to a religious decision-making body. The effect of the line of 
cases from the Greek courts that the Court of Cassation applied to the applicant’s dispute was 
to defer to muftis as to whether property was mulkia- even to the extent of treating a notarised 
94 ‘Believers, when you contract a debt for a fixed period, put it in writing.  … Call to witness two witnesses of 
your men, if the two are not men, then a man and two women from the witnesses whom you approve; so that if 
one of the two errs, one of them will remind the other. …’ (Qu’ran 2:282). 
For discussion of the relevance of this verse to the law of evidence and the debate about whether it contains.a 
general proposition about the superiority of the testimony of men in Islam: J. Hussain  Islam: Its Law and 
Society, (Federation Press, 2011), 194. See also: M. Fadel ‘Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power and 
Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought’, (1997) 29 International Journal of Middle East Studies 185.
95 Deuteronomy 17:6.
96 See Pellegrini v Italy (2002) 35 EHRR 2, text at n. 74 above.
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non-Islamic will as invalid. Seen in this light the applicant’s claim that she had been deprived 
of a right to a regular determination97 of her dispute according to the law seems credible. The 
Grand Chamber, however, tackled the question of deference from a different angle, holding 
that to accord this degree of deference (in so far as it resulted in discriminatory treatment under 
Art 14) did not have a legitimate aim and was disproportionate.
The question of the responsibility of state courts to scrutinise religious adjudication is a theme 
running through the Strasbourg jurisprudence, as can be seen from several examples. As noted 
in Part IV above a certain degree of non-interference in the affairs of religious communities is 
required in order to respect their religious autonomy. However, if carried to the extent that 
religious matters are non-justiciable before domestic courts there is a risk that that religious 
groups effectively enjoy legal immunity. The Strasbourg approach to excessive use of the non-
justiciability principle by domestic courts in religious law/ autonomy cases is illustrated in 
Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy.98 There the Court found a violation of Articles 10 and 6 arising 
from the refusal to re-employ a lecturer in legal philosophy at a Catholic university in Milan 
(who had served more than 30 years under a series of temporary contracts) following an 
objection by the Congregation for Catholic Education to his views.99 Vallauri’s attempts to 
challenge the university’s decision in the Italian courts failed. Ultimately the Consiglio di Stato 
applied existing doctrine under which the inability to challenge the Holy See’s decision in the 
civil courts was compatible with constitutional guarantees of freedom of instruction and 
freedom of religion.100 The European Court of Human Rights found that there was an 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression, which although prescribed by 
Italian law and with the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others” (namely, the 
University’s interest in basing its teaching on Catholic doctrine), had not been ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’.  Although it was not for the domestic authorities to examine questions of 
religious doctrine, in the Strasbourg Court’s view the administrative courts should have 
addressed the lack of reasons for the Faculty Board decision, in the interests of ‘the principle 
of adversarial debate’. For similar reasons by a majority of 6 to 1 the Court also found a breach 
97 The Grand Chamber itself noted at para. 153 of its judgment that the mufti’s jurisdiction applied only to 
Islamic wills and intestate succession and not to other types of inheritance.
98 App no 39128/05 (ECtHR,20 October 2009).
99 Approval from the Congregation for Catholic Education was a requirement of the post.
100 Judgment of 18 June 2005.
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of Article 6 because the lack of reasons impaired the applicant’s effective access to a court.101  
While recognition of religious autonomy could justify the university’s refusal to employ 
someone who in its view did not conform to its religious ethos, this could not extend to a point 
blank refusal to explain the basis for that conclusion. Put positively: religious authorities may 
have a responsibility to explain their decisions and state bodies should not accept their 
conclusions without question.
 In two cases, respectively from Spain and Croatia, involving the dismissal of Catholic religious 
education teachers for breaching requirements of canon law the Court has addressed the duties 
of state authorities with regard to such religious determinations.102 Both arose against the 
backcloth of the arrangements under concordats that the Holy See has with a number of states 
covering, inter alia, religious education in state schools. Under these arrangements religious 
education teachers require in effect a licence from the local diocesan authorities, which can be 
withdrawn for breaches of canon law, resulting in the teachers’ dismissal. The European Court 
of Human Rights found the dismissals did not violate Article 8 (the right to respect for private 
life) because their purpose was to protect the rights and freedom of others, namely the religious 
autonomy of the Catholic church. This approach is undoubtedly controversial because of the 
teachers’ employment status as public employees but that is not the concern here. Rather, it is 
the approach to judicial scrutiny of determinations of Canon Law which is of interest in the 
present discussion.
In Fernández Martínez v Spain103 the Grand Chamber found that the withdrawal of a priest’s 
licence under Canon Law (leading to his dismissal from his post in a state school) had not 
infringed his right to respect for private or family life because in the view of the majority (the 
Grand Chamber divided 9:8) the Spanish courts had satisfactorily weighed this against the right 
of the Church authorities to religious autonomy under Article 9. The bishop withdrew of the 
applicant’s licence because of ‘scandal’ (the absence of ‘scandal’ was a pre-requisite under the 
101 The Court considered that there was no need to examine separately the applicant’s complaints under Articles 
9, 13 and 14.
102 Travaŝ v. Croatia App no 75581/13 (ECtHR, 4 October 2016); Fernandez-Martinez v Spain App no 6030/07 
(ECtHR, 12 June 2014), Grand Chamber.
103 Fernández Martínez v. Spain App no 6030/07 (ECtHR, 12 June 2014), Grand Chamber. For contrasting 
analyses see: J. Martinez-Torron, ‘Fernández Martínez v. Spain: An unclear intersection of rights’ and I. Leigh, 
‘Reversibility, Proportionality and Conflicting Rights: Fernández Martínez v. Spain’ in S. Smet and E. Brems 
(eds.) When Human Rights Clash at the European Court of Human Rights: Conflict or Harmony? (Oxford 
University Press 2017).
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Papal rescript allowing the bishop to authorise him to continue as a teacher although he had 
lost his ‘clerical state’ due his marriage).104 ‘Scandal’ was a Canon Law term,105 although it 
was not strictly defined, and an underlying issue therefore was whether the church authorities 
had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether it applied or, if not, to what extent the courts 
could review their decision. There were grounds for scepticism about the behaviour of the 
church authorities since the withdrawal of his licence took place not when they became aware 
that the applicant was married and had five children, but only years later when his position was 
publicised as a result of following a meeting of an advocacy group, the Movement for Optional 
Celibacy, to which he belonged. Moreover, the Spanish Constitutional Court had decided that 
the state’s duty of neutrality prevented it from ruling on the bishop’s use of ‘scandal’. 
Nonetheless the majority of the Grand Chamber found that the relevant Spanish jurisprudence 
allowed the courts to form an independent assessment taking account of all relevant factors 
related to the proportionality exercise. Although the Spanish Constitutional Court had deferred 
to the ecclesiastical authorities on various matters, its jurisprudence did not require it to do so 
where the Bishop had acted other than for strictly religious reasons and it had verified that this 
was not the case here.106 
In Travaŝ v. Croatia.107 the applicant, who was a layman, had his canonical mandate to teach 
religious education withdrawn when he remarried after obtaining a civil divorce, but without 
seeking or obtaining an annulment of his first marriage by the religious authorities. The Court 
found that there had been an interference with the is right to private life but that this had been 
prescribed by law, for the protection of rights and freedoms of others and necessary in a 
democratic society. The task of the domestic courts was to:  
to scrutinise whether a proper balance was achieved between the competing rights of the 
Church to respect for its autonomy and the applicant’s rights under the Convention . …. 
It was therefore for the courts to ensure that the Church’s autonomy is exercised in a 
104 A Papal dispensation from celibacy had been granted at his own request but only after a delay of some 13 
years from when he had applied.
105 Code of Canon Law, Canon 1394.
106 Fernández Martínez v. Spain, paras. 150 and 151. The dissenting minority judgment treated the relationship 
between the Ministry of Education and the bishop as constituting a form of ‘delegation’ by the Spanish State of 
the powers to appoint teachers to the Church, for which it nonetheless remained responsible. For the minority it 
was the Ministry of Education’s action in giving effect to the bishop’s decision (not the Courts in reviewing it) 
which was therefore critical. Since the Ministry had simply endorsed the decision the dissenting judges found no 
evidence that it had taken into account the applicant’s right to respect for private life or the effects of the decision 
on that right: ibid Joint Dissenting Opinion, para. 26.
107Travaŝ v. Croatia App no 75581/13 (ECtHR, 4 October 2016); and see further in Part VI below concerning 
the relevance of consent.
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manner which is not arbitrary or taken for a purpose that is unrelated to the exercise of 
its autonomy and that it did not produce effects disproportionately interfering with the 
applicant’s Convention rights . …108
The European Court of Human Rights noted that the domestic courts (in particular the 
Constitutional Court) had reviewed the applicant’s case in detail taking into account all the 
relevant factors, notably his understanding of special allegiance owed towards the teachings 
and doctrine of the Church that followed from his status as a teacher of Catholic religious 
education, his position within the State education system, the attempts of the authorities to find 
him alternative work and the other employment opportunities open to him. The domestic 
judicial process had been thorough and, in view of this level of scrutiny, it could not be said 
that the canonical decision was improper.109
It will be apparent that the Strasbourg Court does not regard its position as re-opening the 
review conducted by the domestic authorities of adjudication by religious bodies, but rather 
reviewing their thoroughness and plausibility within the framework of proportional balancing. 
We will now consider the second test of compatibility to emerge from Court’s jurisprudence- 
the criterion of voluntariness.
VI. Voluntariness, Consent and Waiver
The question of whether the application of Sharia principles of succession to the Muslim 
community in Trace was consensual or compulsory was central to the dispute in Molla Sali v 
Greece. The applicant submitted that the practice of the Greek courts, arising from a series of 
Court of Cassation judgments, de facto treated jurisdiction of the muftis as compulsory, even 
where members of the Muslim community did not consent, and thus constituted discrimination 
on grounds of religion which did not pursue a legitimate aim.110 Furthermore, she argued that 
a system which forced to individuals to renounce membership of a religious community in 
order to be able to access the civil courts in Greece would amount to creating a segregationist 
system of Sharia law.111 It is clear that the Grand Chamber agreed about the importance of 
voluntariness: the absence of consent was critical to its finding that the discrimination inherent 
108 ibid para. 109.
109 ibid para. 113.
110 Molla Sali v Greece, para. 101.
111 ibid para. 104.
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in application of Sharia inheritance law in Thrace to the Muslim community served no 
reasonable and objective justification.112  Proof of waiver of important public interests had to 
be more explicit than simple derivation from membership of religious minority group in order 
to justify discriminatory treatment.113 It buttressed its argument with reference to Article 3.1 of 
the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which 
provides:
Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be 
treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or 
from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.114
It is notable in this respect that the court contrasted this with the position of Sharia councils in 
the United Kingdom and with the reforms that Greece itself adopted while the case was pending 
(and which came into force in January 2018).115 Under the amended Greek legislation the 
agreement of all parties is a precondition to a mufti exercising jurisdiction in matters of 
marriage, divorce or inheritance.116 As the Grand Chamber noted, prior to these reforms Greece 
was in the position of being ‘the only country in Europe which, up until the material time, 
applied Sharia law to a section of its citizens against their wishes.’117 
On the other hand, where the European Court of Human Rights is persuaded that that religious 
adjudication results from an applicant’s voluntary choices the jurisprudence shows that it is 
less likely to find an infringement of the Convention. In Travas v Croatia the Court emphasised 
that the applicant’s predicament was the result of choices that he had made, in particular, as a 
teacher of religious education: 
the applicant had knowingly and voluntarily accepted a heightened duty of loyalty 
towards the Catholic Church, which had limited the scope of his right to respect for his 
112 ibid paras. 158-161.
113 ibid para. 156.
114 ibid para. 67; Greece has signed but not ratified this Convention.
115 ibid paras 159 and 160.
116 Law no. 4511/2018, s. 1.
117 Molla Sali v. Greece, para. 158. Up until 2011 France applied Sharia in the territory of Mayotte: 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Compatibility of Sharia law with the European Convention on Human Rights (n. 90 above), paras.46-49.
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private and family life to a certain degree. …[and] stressed that such contractual 
limitations were permissible under the Convention if they were freely accepted118
This buttressed the conclusion that there was no infringement of his Article 8 rights. Moreover, 
while aware of the Church’s position that his first marriage subsisted under Canon Law, he had 
not sought to have it annulled and had chosen not to effectively participate in annulment 
proceedings brought by his first wife. Accordingly, for the purpose of assessing the 
proportionality of the interference with his right to private and family life, the Court 
characterised his position: 
the applicant decided to disregard the requirements of special allegiance towards the 
teachings and doctrine of the Church, concomitant with his status of a teacher of Catholic 
religious education. He thus brought himself in a situation in which he lost his canonical 
mandate to perform that function. Even so, he still expected to retain the right to a 
teaching job in the State education system.119
Of course, the extent to which participation in religious adjudication is voluntary is a key point 
in contention between proponents and objectors to accommodation. Unlike parallel systems, 
most existing forms of religious adjudication in liberal states are (in principle anyway) 
voluntary and the question is whether these should be extended. Critics dispute, however, when 
it comes to religious adjudication over family matters i  particular whether participation of 
women from religious minorities is truly voluntary. The social penalty for not using these 
procedures may be for the woman to be cut off from her ethnic and religious community. 
Shachar describes the ‘cruel zero-sum choice’120 facing those can enforce their rights under 
civil law but only at the cost of ‘exiting’ or cutting themselves off from their religious 
community. Ronan McCrea has recently argued that it may not be feasible to ensure genuine 
voluntary engagement with minority legal orders and that enhancing their recognition 
undermines shared citizenship.121 There are references in Christian, Islamic and Judaic 
118 Travaŝ v. Croatia, para. 92.
119 ibid para. 96.
120 A. Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Multicultural Model: Group Accommodation and Individual Rights’ (1998) 8 
Windsor Rev. Legal & Social Issues 83, 107.
121 R McCrea ,’Why the Role of Religious Tribunals in the Legal System Should Not Be Expanded’ Public Law 
[2016] 214-222.
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teachings emphasising that differences between believers should be settled without going to 
outsiders, although the application of these to modern legal conditions is not straightforward.122 
Viewed benevolently such teachings put an emphasis on mediation and reconciliation. Applied 
more stringently, however, they can be used to punish and deter co-religionists from accessing 
secular courts.123 Even for those emphasizing that participation is voluntary the implications 
are not clear-cut. Arguably a system in which religious adjudication is not recognised (as with 
Sharia Councils in the UK) enables women to pick and choose which religious body to 
approach.124 Others point out, however, that women using these councils may not always be 
fully aware of (or may be misled about) their status under UK law, or may be coerced into 
using them, particularly if they are non-English speakers.125 Such concerns do not necessarily 
lead in the direction of non-recognition: they could be met by strengthening of safeguards to 
ensure genuine voluntariness.126 This was the approach endorsed by the Independent Review 
of Sharia Councils, described in Part II above.
Impliedly, the Grand Chamber in Molla Sali appears to have endorsed the position that states 
do not have a positive obligation to prohibit non-binding religious adjudication, provided if 
satisfies the criterion of voluntariness. And, presumably, it follows from the Grand Chamber’s 
122 Respectively, Matthew 5:25-26 and Luke 12:13-15; An-Nisaa’ 4: 59; Y. Feit, ‘The Prohibition Against 
Going to Secular Courts’, 1 (2012) Journal of the Beth Din of America 30-46; J. Burnside, God, Justice and 
Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible (Oxford 2011) 110-111.
123 On perceived pressure to use religious law in preference to civil law: F.Ahmed and S. Luk, ‘Religious 
arbitration: a study of legal safeguards’ (2011) 77(3) Arbitration 290, 293 and 302; J. Brechin, ‘A study of the 
use of Sharia law in religious arbitration in the United Kingdom and the concerns that this raises for human 
rights’ (2013) 15(3) Ecc. LJ 293, 300; Jackson, ‘Transformative accommodation’ and religious law’ 150.
 cf  The comment of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams ‘if any kind of plural jurisdiction is 
recognised, it would presumably have to be under the rubric that no ‘supplementary’ jurisdiction could have the 
power to deny access to the rights granted to other citizens or to punish its members for claiming those rights’: 
R. Williams, ‘Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective’ (2008) 10 Ecc LJ 262-282.
124 S. Bano, Muslim Women and Shari’ah Councils: Transcending the Boundaries of Community and Law 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 207.
125 This risk has also been raised by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (n. 54 above).
126Likewise Russell Sandberg has recently argued that: ‘We need to look more broadly at religious adjudication, 
how law can deal with adjudications that are enforced religiously and socially in contexts where legal enforcement 
has not been sought or is irrelevant, how the law can determine whether or not an agreement is voluntary or not . 
… ‘Russell Sandberg, “The Council of Europe and sharia: an unsatisfactory Resolution” in Law & Religion UK, 
29 January 2019 , http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2019/01/29/the-council-of-europe-and-sharia-an-
unsatisfactory-resolution/ (accessed 31 January 2019).
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Article 14 analysis that even formal recognition of religious law would be permissible provided 
(unlike the position under Sharia law in Western Thrace) it was non-discriminatory.
The Court’s Article 6 jurisprudence has not addressed religious arbitration per se. Were it to 
do so the questions would inevitably arise of how far it is possible to contract out of protection 
and of the extent of the state’s responsibilities. On several occasions it has been found that a 
contracting state is not liable for the actions of an arbitrator in a private dispute. In Deweer v 
Belgium the Court noted that waiver of right of access to court in an arbitration agreement ‘does 
not in principle offend against the Convention.’127 In Nordstrom-Janzon v Netherlands128 the 
Commission found there was no obligation to ensure that voluntary arbitration proceedings 
were in conformity with Article 6. A contracting state could determine the grounds for quashing 
an arbitral award and the lack of redress before the domestic courts for a challenge to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality did not engage Article 6. The Commission noted the voluntary nature 
of waiver of the right to legal proceedings but suggested that duress (which was not alleged) 
could vitiate any such waiver. That reservation leaves open the possibility that a party to 
religious dispute settlement might in future be able to argue that Article 6 should nevertheless 
apply because consent was not freely given, for example because of community pressure to 
submit to religious adjudication,129 although it is unclear what evidence would be needed to 
establish duress.130 In the absence of such an argument, however, the voluntary nature of 
religious arbitration will constitute an insurmountable hurdle to finding a violation of the 
Convention in most cases. 
VII. Conclusion
Ran Hischl and Ayelet Shachar have noted that:
 From Canada to India and Britain to South Africa, the specter of litigants turning to 
religious or customary sources of law as authoritative guides for regulating their 
127 Deweer v. Belgium (1980) Series A no. 35, para. 49. 
128 App no. 28101/95 (Commission Decision, 27 November 1996). See also Jakob Boss Sohne KG v Germany 
App no. 18479/91 (Commission Decision, 2 December 1991). The jurisprudence distinguishes between 
voluntary and compulsory arbitration, treating the latter as subject to Art. 6: Tabbane v. Switzerland App no. 
46109/ 12 (ECtHR, 1 March 2012), paras. 26 and 27.
129 Text at n. 120 above. 
130 In relation to the potentially analogous position of participation in professional sporting events, the Court has 
held that if participation is conditional on submitting to arbitration then Article 6 will apply: Mutu and Pechstein 
v. Switzerland Apps no 40575/10 and67474 (ECtHR, 4 February 2019), paras. 113-5 and 121-3.
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behavior, alongside or in lieu of other norms, has risen to the forefront of public debate 
and constitutional battle. At stake is not merely the question whether a particular 
individual or group may seek exemption from a general rule, but rather which type of 
institution—a public court enforcing democratically enacted laws and regulations, or a 
faith-based tribunal applying religious based norms and practices—will have the 
authority to make a final, binding decision.131
This article’s distinctive contribution to that debate is to specifically address the application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights to different forms of religious adjudication. It has 
done so by, firstly, clarifying the conceptual confusion surrounding discussion of recognition 
of religious law, drawing a fundamental distinction between parallel systems. In parallel 
systems the state itself recognises religious norms, and plural systems in which space is given 
by the state for religious adjudication applying religious norms. As explained in Part II, these 
plural arrangements can take a variety of forms, from those where the determinations of 
religious institutions are formally adopted or applied at one end of the scale through to those 
where they are merely tolerated at the other. Different human rights considerations apply to 
these various permutations.
From an analysis of the Strasbourg jurisprudence it is clearly unlikely that a parallel system 
would be able to comply with the Convention. Any scheme of this kind would certainly involve 
a substantive difference in treatment of individuals according to primary norms, contrary to 
Article 14. The non-consensual state imposition of religious norms on religious groups would 
fail the criterion of non-discrimination that emerges from the Court’s Refah Partisi and Molla 
Sali decisions 
Plural systems, on the other hand, are more complex and varied in their human rights 
implications. They range, on the one hand, from adjudication which the state recognises in 
qualified form, such as religious arbitration under commercial agreements and family 
determinations of ecclesiastical tribunals to, on the other hand, those that have no civil law 
analogue and which are not intended to be legally binding. Where the outcome of voluntary 
religious adjudication is adopted by state institutions substantive and procedural protection 
under the European Convention, for example under Articles 8 and 6, will be engaged. State 
courts are required to exercise a supervisory role and Strasbourg will review how thoroughly 
131 Hischl and Shachar, ‘Competing Orders’, 433-434,
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they have done so. Nonetheless the jurisprudence grants some flexibility, for example to take 
account of religious autonomy, especially in clergy discipline and doctrinal dispute cases, and, 
when determining if any interference with private life is disproportionate, to acknowledge the 
importance of an individual’s autonomy in placing himself under an obligation of religious 
allegiance.
Different considerations apply where those resorting to religious adjudication have no intention 
to create legal relations or legal effects, as with non-binding adjudication. It is clear from the 
recent decision in Molla Sali v Greece that the state has no duty under the ECHR to facilitate 
religious adjudication of this kind. 
The European Court of Human Rights has not so far encountered legislation of the kind 
applicable in some US states forbidding religious adjudication.132 In a hypothetical situation of 
this kind, individual autonomy arguments would be at their strongest and the case for 
intervention, if tenable at all, would rest on the dangers that weaker members of religious 
communities may not be fully or accurately informed, or indeed may be positively 
misinformed, about the legal status of the religious adjudication that they have entered into.  
Nor has the Court had occasion to consider the general compatibility of a voluntary non-
binding system of religious adjudication. While a state is under no Convention obligation to 
facilitate religious minorities in this way, it cannot be said that would be impossible to do so 
compatibly with the ECHR. I have argued that, in line with the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the 
questions of the adequacy of judicial scrutiny and of voluntariness would be determinative in 
such a case. While national courts can properly defer to religious autonomy, this must not 
amount to de facto immunity and, where conflicting rights are at stake, they have a 
responsibility to scrutinise how the religious body has struck the balance. The jurisprudence on 
voluntariness is less developed but nonetheless suggests that the presence of duress would 
render religious adjudication unfair. This leaves a question that has not been tackled here: 
whether proponents of religious adjudication are willing to pay the price for legal recognition 
or continued toleration. 
132 n 21 above.
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